The Attack on Chapter 11 by Boshkoff, Douglass G.
Maurer School of Law: Indiana University
Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty Faculty Scholarship
1993
The Attack on Chapter 11
Douglass G. Boshkoff
Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
The Attack on Chapter 11
Douglass G Boshkoft*
"After twelve years of experience with the new Bankruptcy Code, people
are angry with the bankruptcy process. Creditors are angry with debtors
who have resisted payment and thwarted their collection efforts. Em-
ployees are angry with companies that have laid them off while the big
boys remain in their high payingjobs. Tort victims are angry with compa-
nies because they are not getting enough money to compensate them for
all that they have lost.Judges are angry with disputants because they have
neither the time nor the resources to monitor the cases in their care. And
everyone is angry with the lawyers because they are getting rich."'
Professor Warren's bleak appraisal of the situation does not overstate the
current crisis of confidence in the American bankruptcy system. Lead
stories and editorials in prominent newspapers ("Critics of Bankruptcy
Law See Inefficiency and Waste ' 2, "Bankruptcy Needs Reform"3 ), lurid
captions over articles in prominent popular publications ("Sharing the
World's Corporate Carrion" , "It Pays To Go Broke", 5 "Eastern: The
Wings of Greed ' 6) and more than enough books with titles such as A
Feast for Lawyers: Inside Chapter 11 An Expos7 testify to the existence of
great public interest in, and concern with, current events in the insolv-
ency world. As the American bankruptcy' system approaches its
* Robert H McKinney, Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington. © Douglass G
Boshkoff, 1993. I am grateful for the comments of my colleague, Bruce Markell, and the re-
search assistance ofBridgetteJ Faulkner, Class of 1994.
1 Warren, "The Untenable Case for Repeal
of Chapter 1 I" (1992) 102 Yale LJ 437,
477.
2 Passell, "Critics of Bankruptcy Law See
Inefficiency and Waste", New York Times,
13 April 1993, at Al.
3 "Bankruptcy Needs Reform", New York
Tiens, 14 April 1993, at A14.
4 "Sharing the World's Corporate Car-
rion", Economist, 4January 1992, at 67.
5 Burrows, "It Pays To Go Broke", USNews
& World Report, 8 April 1991, at 49.
6 Bernstein, "Eastern: The Wings of
Greed", Business Week, II November 1991,
at 34.
7 Stein, A Feast ForLawyers: Inside Chapter I-
An Exposi (1989).
8 Americans use the term "bankruptcy" to
refer both to proceedings in which individ-
uals obtain a discharge from their obliga-
tions and to proceedings in which
businesses, large and small, are liquidated
or reorganised. One court system, one set
of procedural rules, and one substantive
law are provided for all financially dis-
tressed entities.
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100th birthday, it has far more public critics than supporters and much
attention has been directed at the business reorganization provisions. A
few commentators have even called for repeal of Chapter 11.9
While it is not likely that repeal will occur, some changes in the law can
be expected. Before examining proposals for reform, it will be helpful
both to review the antecedents of Chapter 11 and to understand the
most important aspects of this reorganization process.
I. The antecedents of Chapter 11
The first permanent bankruptcy statute dates from 189810 and contained
nothing comparable to today's Chapter 11. Prior to 1933, business reor-
ganizations were accomplished through use of a judicial device, the
equity receivership." After 1933, various forms of statutory reorgan-
ization developed and, by the late 1960s, the most prominent were
Chapters X and XI of the 1898 Act.12 Chapter X was designed to ad-
dress the financial problems of large corporations with publicly held debt
or equity securities. Chapter XI provided a simpler procedure for re-
structuring the affairs of troubled businesses. There were a number of
substantive differences between these two chapters, including the fact
that management was displaced by an independent trustee only in
Chapter X. It was assumed that privately-owned debtors would seek
protection under Chapter XI, while debtors with publicly-held debt and
equity securities would file under Chapter X. In fact, many publicly
owned entities also sought to reorganise under Chapter XI. Since it was
sometimes possible to force a transfer from Chapter XI to Chapter X,
costly and wasteful litigation challenging management's choice of chap-
ter became common.
By the late 1960s, it was clear that a major revision of our insolvency
system was necessary. A Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States was established in 1970. Three years later, the Commis-
sion transmitted its report to Congress. In place of Chapters X and XI, it
recommended a single reorganization process, influenced by the fact
that Chapter XI was much preferred in practice to Chapter X.
9 Bradley and Rosenzweig, "The Untenable "11 Stern, "Note, Failed Markets and Failed
Case for Chapter 11", (1992) 101 Yale LJ Solutions: The Unwitting Formulation of
1043 has received the most attention in the the Corporate Reorganization Tech-
national press. nique", (1990) 90 Col L Rev 783.
10 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Ch 541, 30 Stat 12 Maclachlan, Bankruptcy (1956) 370-372.
544 (repealed 1978).
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"Although few statistics are available as to the make-up of Chapter XI
cases, it is readily apparent that Chapter XI has evolved into the domin-
ant reorganization vehicle...
The reason underlying the preference of lawyers for Chapter XI is ob-
vious, although not often stated. A debtor initiates a Chapter XI pro-
ceeding, and only the debtor can propose a plan under Chapter XI. The
debtor is normally allowed to operate the business. A concomitant of con-
tinued management is the continuation of the employment of the debtor's
attorney. On the other hand, if a Chapter X proceeding is initiated, a dis-
interested trustee is appointed and counsel for the debtor has a greatly re-
duced function . . . Although proponents of Chapter XI generally talk
about speed and economy, control and the "best interest" test obviously
are the dominating reasons for the preference. The obvious advantages of
Chapter XI to the debtor and his counsel have led to its use by large cor-
porations...
It is not feasible to attempt to carve out of Chapter XI certain cases
which should be under Chapter X... The only solution is an elimination
of the disparate procedures. The Commission therefore recommends a
comprehensive business reorganization chapter." 3
The statute finally adopted by Congress differed in many respects
from the Commission proposal. Nonetheless, it retained the proposal
that Chapters X and XI be united. The public interest was to be pro-
tected through displacement of management by an independent trustee
in many large cases.14 Congress did not agree with the Commission's po-
sition that a trustee should often be appointed. § 1104 of the present stat-
ute 5 only authorises the appointment of independent management in a
limited set of circumstances.16
The fact that there is no visible change in management upon the com-
mencement of a Chapter 11 case has probably contributed to public dis-
trust of the reorganization process,
prominent national businesses such
13 Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States, H R Doc No 137, 93rd
Gong, 1st Sess, pt I, at 246-248 [herei-
nafter cited as Bankruptcy Report].
14 §7-102(a) Bankruptcy Report, pt I, at 221.
15 11 USC §1104(a) (1988).
16 §1104. Appointment of trustee...
(a) At any time after the commencement
of the case but before confirmation of a
plan, on request of a party in interest or the
United States trustee, and after notice and
a hearing, the court shall order the
appointment of a trustee -
(1) for cause, including fraud, dishon-
especially with regard to some
as Eastern Airlines and Johns-
esty, incompetence, or gross mismanage-
ment of the affairs of tle debtor;by current
management, either bfore or after the
commencement of the'case, or similar
cause, but not including the number of
holders of securities of the debtor or the
amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor;
or
(2) if such appointment is in the interest
of creditors, any equity security holders,
and other interests of the estate, without
regard to the number of holders of securi-
ties of the debtor or the amount of assets or
liabilities of the debtor.
1993
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Manville. Published accounts of bankruptcy litigation often highlight the
fact that the old leadership is still in control. Even so, as we shall later see,
current legislative proposals to change the law do not include a provision
for routine management displacement.
II. The mechanics of Chapter 11
The American law of bankruptcy is found primarily in Title 11 of the
United States Code. This title is divided into eight chapters. Chapters 1,
3 and 5 contain provisions of general application. The remaining chap-
ters authorise one form of liquidation (Chapter 7) and four types of reor-
ganization (Chapters 9, 11, 12 and 13). It is customary to identify a
bankruptcy by simply referring to the chapter under which it is
commenced.
The proceedings begin with the filing of a petition, 17 usually a volun-
tary filing by the debtor. Even though the complexity of the Chapter 11
process makes this type of reorganization appropriate only for major
business concerns, it is also used by enterprises of modest size. §3628 im-
mediately imposes a moratorium (the automatic stay) on all collection
activity, including the attempts of secured creditors to realise on their se-
curity interests. §362 also authorises the court to grant relief from stay
"for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in
property. . . ."'9 Theoretically, the secured party is entitled either to
protection against any erosion in the value of its collateral or relief from
stay.
In practice, relief from stay is seldom granted if, as is usually the case,
the collateral is an essential ingredient of the business enterprise. It is al-
most impossible to persuade a bankruptcy judge that creditor collection
activity should go forward, when the loss of the collateral will prejudice
prospects for a reorganization. Instead, the secured party must hope for
"adequate protection" which can take various forms including a lien on
other assets or court ordered payments to compensate for a possible de-
cline in collateral value.
2 0
One shortcoming of adequate protection payments is that they will of-
ten not compensate the lender for lost opportunity costs. Let us assume
that Creditor has lent Debtor $1,000,000 and has a lien on collateral
with a value of only $500,000. After the Chapter 11 petition is filed,
17 11 USC §§301,303 (1988).
18 11 USC §362(a) (1988).
19 11 USC §362(d)(i) (1988).
20 l1 USC §361 (1988).
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Creditor would like to begin receiving interest for the use of its collateral
since it is denied the opportunity to invest elsewhere. But no post-
petition interest will accrue 2' until confirmation occurs. 22 In the interim,
Creditor is entitled to adequate protection payments only to protect
against a decline in the value of the collateral below $500,000.23
Equally frustrating for a secured claimant may be the inability to ob-
tain a ruling in its request for relief from the stay. An appeal is not norm-
ally possible until the trial court has entered a final order. 24 Congress
foresaw the possibility that the bankruptcy judge might wish to forestall
appellate review of a ruling against the secured claimant simply by fail-
ing to issue a decision on the merits. §362(e)25 contains detailed proced-
ural rules governing the commencement and conclusion of various
stages in the hearing process. The purpose of this provision is to establish
an outside limit of 90 days for the issuance of a final (and appealable) de-
cision on the creditor's request. Inexplicably, while authorising both a
preliminary and final hearing, the statute fails to supply a date for con-
clusion of the latter. At one time, a rule of bankruptcy procedure set this
deadline. This provision has now been withdrawn, 26 probably because of
doubts concerning its validity27 and the secured creditor cannot force an
unwilling judge to a final decision on the merits.
Secured creditors have also been particularly vocal in their criticism of
the reorganization process as it applies to "single asset" cases. These
cases are essentially real estate bankruptcies in which the debtor's only
significant asset is a parcel of real property and the principal claimant is a
creditor with a lien on this asset.28 Much of the criticism is prompted by
the lack of compensation for lost opportunity costs and the large amount
of time which may pass before the debtor proposes a reorganization
plan.
The current statute does not require that a plan be filed by a specific
date. Furthermore, only the debtor may propose a reorganization plan
during the first 120 days of the reorganization.2 1 If a plan is filed within
21 11 USC §502(b)(2) (1988) disallows claims 24 See I Lawrence P King, Collier on Bank-
for post-petition interest on pre-petidon ruptcy, (1993) para 3.03[6].
claims. 25 11 USC §362(e) (1988).
22 After confirmation ofthe plan, the creditor 26 8 Lawrence P King, Collier on Bankruptcy
who is denied access to the collateral is (1993) para 4001.04.
entitled to interest on its secured claim 27 See In Re Roberts, 68 BR 1004 (Bankr E D
($500,000 in the text hypothetical) or Mich 1987).
equivalent compensation. 11 USC 28 Governmental policy, including tax pol-
§1 29(b)((2)(A)(i)(Il)) (1988). icy, provides incentives for investors to
23 United Sao Assn v Timbers of Inwood Forest create single-asset entities.
Assocs, (1988) 484 US 365. 29 11 USC §1121(a) (1988).
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120 days of the petition then the debtor has up to 180 days, again meas-
ured from the petition date, to secure the necessary acceptances. 30This
period of exclusivity can be extended or reduced "for cause"."' In prac-
tice, it is routinely and repeatedly extended, sometimes for several years.
In the interim, old management usually continues in control and cred-
itors with secured or unsecured claims are held at bay by the automatic
stay.
The plan approval process also has generated a great deal of criticism.
The statute requires that a proposed plan be accepted by the various af-
fected creditor classes. 32 Acceptances cannot be solicited until the court
has approved a disclosure statement. This statement is transmitted to the
various classes no later than the time when the plan proponent solicits
their favourable votes. 33 Thus, even after a plan has been submitted, fur-
ther delay is possible until the disclosure statement has been approved.
Chapter 11 provides a legal framework within which bargaining over
the terms of a reorganization plan occurs. Most confirmed plans are the
result of a negotiating process which requires the consent of all affected
classes of creditors and equity interests. Indeed, some criticism of Chap-
ter 11 is directed at the settlement incentives created by the present stat-
utory scheme. Occasionally, a class acceptance cannot be obtained. The
statute provides a means for achieving confirmation in such a case.
"Cramdown" is the popular term for confirmation of a plan despite the
dissent of a class of unsecured claims. Cramdown requires a judicial
hearing and cannot occur unless every class below the dissenting class is
eliminated (the "absolute priority" rule). Furthermore, every member of
each class must receive at least as much as would be received in a liquida-
tion bankruptcy (the "best interest" test).
Assume that a corporation has three ownership classes, unsecured
debt, subordinated debt and equity. The absolute priority rule34 requires
elimination of the latter two groups if the unsecured debt does not accept
the plan or is not paid or provided for in full. If only the subordinated
debt dissents, then the equity must be eliminated. The existence of the
absolute priority rule makes it impossible to achieve cramdown in any
business where continuation of a subordinate interest is essential.35 If a
30 11 USC § 1121 (c)(3) (1988). 33 11 USC § 1125(b) (1988).
31 11 USC §1121(d) (1988). 34 See Markell, "Owners, Auctions, and Ab-
32 11 USC §1 129(a)(8) (1988). Absent con- solute Priority in Bankruptcy Reorgan-
sent, confirmation can only be achieved izations", (1991) 44 Stan L Rev 69.
through a difficult and costly process (corn- 35 One objective of American farm policy is
monly referred to as "cramdown") pre- to preserve the family farm. Chapter 11 is
scribed by § 1129(b) (1988). not a practical alternative for family farm-
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plan cannot be negotiated, the business must be liquidated or the Chap-
ter 11 proceeding must be dismissed.
III. The critics
Chapter I I is under attack from all sides. What follows is a brief descrip-
tion of the major forces driving the current controversy. 36
1. The e nomlsts
The United States' Constitution authorises Congress "To establish...
uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies .... ,37 Congress made lim-
ited use of this power during the nineteenth century. The Bankruptcy
Acts adopted in 1800, 1841 and 1867 were in effect for only short periods
of time. Not until 1898, did Congress enact permanent bankruptcy
legislation.
In the first half of this century, there was considerable academic inter-
est in establishing the nature of a bankruptcy law.38Scholars were con-
cerned with two questions: (i) the constitutionality of the statute adopted
by Congress, and (ii) the effect of the federal statute upon state statutes
which also dealt with insolvency problems. This scholarly interest sub-
sided after the constitutionality of the bankruptcy law had been firmly es-
tablished and the extent of its pre-emptive effect on state law was clear.
We have recently seen a renewal of academic interest in the essential
nature of bankruptcy, particularly in the works of Professor Douglas
Baird (University of Chicago) and Thomas Jackson (University of Vir-
ginia). Writing both separately and together, Professors Baird andJack-
son have argued that bankruptcy exists to solve the problems caused by
suboptimal creditor decision-making. In his widely read (and sometimes
ers if cramdown of unsecured claims is the extensive academic writing in this area.
necessary because the absolute priority For a detailed description of what is being
rule requires elimination of the farmer's written, see Skeel, Jr, "Markets, Courts,
interest in the reorganised business. Con- and the Brave New World of Bankruptcy
gress has created a form of reorganization Theory", (1993) Wisc L Rev 465.
(Chap 12) to deal with the financial prob- 37 US Const Art I, §8, cl 4.
lems of farmers. The absolute priority rule 38 Radin, "The Nature of Bankruptcy",
does not apply in Chap 12 proceedings, (1940) U Pa L Rev 1; Williston, "The
but the best interest test remains in force. Effect of a National Bankruptcy Law
36 This brief summary cannot do justice to Upon State Laws", (1909) 22 Harv L Rev
1993
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reviled) book, 9 The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law,40 ProfessorJackson
observes:
"In analyzing bankruptcy law, as with any other body of law, it helps to
start by identifying first principles. Those principles can then be de-
veloped by defining their potential operation in the existing social, eco-
nomic, and legal world to identify precisely what bankruptcy law should
encompass, how it can accomplish its goals, and the constraints on its abil-
ity to do so. That normative view of bankruptcy law can then be con-
trasted with the Bankruptcy Code as enacted to see whether and to what
extent the existing regime follows the path the principles suggest is the
proper one.
The point of this book is to suggest what the underpinnings of bank-
ruptcy law should be and then to apply that learning to a variety of issues
while testing the current provisions of the Bankruptcy Code against them.
This approach is not unique. In fields as disparate and complex as anti-
trust, oil and gas, intellectual property, and corporate finance, analysis of
discrete legal problems usually begins with a look at the theoretical frame-
work that the law is built upon. But this approach is almost unique to
bankruptcy law. Much bankruptcy analysis is flawed precisely because it
lacks rigor in identifying what is being addressed and why it is a proper
concern of bankruptcy law. For that reason, when a new and urgent
"problem" is discovered in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding,
courts, legislators, and commentators all too often approach its resolution
in an ad hoc manner, by viewing bankruptcy law as somehow conflicting
with - and perhaps overriding - some other urgent social or economic
goal.
4 1
Later in this same book, in a chapter entitled "Reconsidering Reor-
ganizations", ProfessorJackson considers the question "Why not elimin-
ate Chapter 11 ?" and suggests several reasons for doubting that this form
of bankruptcy is necessary.42 His colleague, Douglas Baird later went fur-
ther and suggested how an auction of firm assets might be preferable to
current reorganization practice.43 And in another article, Professor
547. 39 Stan L Rev 1519 contains a more tem-
39 "Undoubtedly, the book will find some ad- perate evaluation ofJackson's work.
mirers among people who think that bad 40 Jackson, The Logi; And Limits of Bankmptcy
law-and-economics is better than no law- (1986).
and-economics .... Carlson, "Philos- 41 Ibid at 2-3.
ophy in Bankruptcy", (1987) 85 Mich L 42 lbidat 218-224.
Rev 1341. Eisenberg, "A Bankruptcy 43 Baird, "The Uneasy Case for Corporate
Machine That Would Go of Itself', (1987) Reorganizations", (1986) 15J Legal Stud
127.
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Baird offered these provocative comments on the role of bankruptcy law
in contemporary society:
"The existence of our bankruptcy law offers policymakers an opportunity
to advance change or reform without squarely debating what they are
doing. In a world without bankruptcy, the question of who should have
rights to a firm's assets would have to be faced directly. There seems little
doubt that Congress could, if it wanted to (and if it acted prospectively),
give workers a lien on the assets of a firm or allow firms in financial trouble
to repudiate collective bargaining agreements. A law could provide that
when any firm liquidated or when its assets were put to a substantially dif-
ferent use, the workers who would lose their jobs as a result would have a
right to some fraction of their annual salary, adjusted by the length of their
service. Congress could create a regulatory agency and require any firm
that wanted to liquidate or change the existing deployment of its assets to
go before the agency and make a showing of hardship before imple-
menting its plans. There are any number of other possible laws that might
have a similar effect. Such laws may be undesirable for a number of rea-
sons. Other laws might advance the same interests at far less cost. But all
of these reforms are possible outside the context of a bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. Indeed, they would be possible even if there were no bankruptcy
law at all as it is traditionally understood. The justification for preserving
the jobs of workers or allowing management to escape from collective
bargaining agreements should not be that it vindicates bankruptcy policy,
but rather that it is sound policy as a general matter.
We live in a world in which we face many tough issues of social policy
and in which we for too long have made altogether casual assumptions
about ownership of assets and the priority of these with rights to them. But
these issues have nothing to do with bankruptcy law, and we should treat
them in our world as we would treat them in a world without bank-
ruptcy.""
Writing jointly and individually, Professors Baird and Jackson have
challenged the need for Chapter 1 1 and have questioned the legitimacy
of what goes on during bankruptcy proceedings of all types, including
reorganizations. These efforts have provoked an ongoing, often heated,
debate about the appropriate objectives of bankruptcy law. Reorgan-
ization bankruptcy would probably be under fire today even if this aca-
demic team had never published a word. However, Professors Baird and
Jackson have created an environment of scepticism in which less theoret-
ical, empirical criticism of bankruptcy, particularly of Chapter 11, re-
ceives a great deal of sympathetic attention.
44 Baird, "A World Without Bankruptcy", 173, at 186.




In 1992, Michael Bradley of the University of Michigan and Michael
Rosenzweig, an Atlanta lawyer, co-authored an article entitled "The
Untenable Case for Chapter 11 .,45 This article was published in the Yale
LawJournal, one of the most prestigious scholarlyjournals in the United
States. Bradley and Rosenzweig argued that the new bankruptcy law
which became effective in 1979 created incentives for management to
remain in control of a financially troubled business while engaging in
business activity that was detrimental both to creditors and to the holders
of equity interests. They called for the repeal of Chapter 11, arguing that
management misbehaviour during reorganizations had increased since
the effective date of Chapter 11. And unlike Professors Baird and Jack-
son, who relied on an elegantly structured theoretical analysis, Bradley
and Rosenzweig captured the public's attention with the facts they of-
fered in support of their thesis. As recently as 12 April 1993, their charges
were included in a front page story in the New York Times under the head-
line "Critics of Bankruptcy Law See Inefficiency and Waste. ' 46 Notwith-
standing some vigorous criticism of their empirical analysis,47Bradley
and Rosenzweig's thesis will probably remain in the public eye. Legis-
lators and other persons in a position to influence Congressional action
are more comfortable with a factual analysis, even if it may be flawed,
than with elaborate theoretical arguments.
3. The practitioe
Practitioner criticism of the current statute is often strongly influenced by
client base. Lawyers representing secured creditors, unsecured creditors,
employees, holders of equity interests all have different views of the reor-
ganization process and seek changes beneficial to their clients.
There is also some criticism from practitioners with less narrowly de-
fined client interests, bankruptcy judges and academics with strong pro-
fessional ties. These critics tend to be concerned with the high failure rate
in Chapter 11,48 the long delay in obtaining confirmation, 49 and the poor
45 Bradley and Rosenzweig, supra n 9, at 2. an operating reorganised business.Jensen-
46 Passell, supra n 2. Conklin, "Do Confirmed Chapter 11
47 See LoPucki, "Strange Visions in a Plans Consummate? The Results of a
Strange World: A Reply to Professors Bra- Study and Analysis of the Law", (1992) 97
dley and Rosenzweig", (1992) 91 Mich L Comm LJ 297, 325.
Rev 79; and Warren, supra n 1, at 1. 49 Jensen-Conldin, supra n 48 at 319 found a
48 A 90% failure rate is a common estimate. 22-month period between petition and
One recent study concluded that only confirmation. LoPucki, "The Trouble
6.5% of Chap 11 proceedings resulted in with Chapter 11", (1993) 1993 Wisc L R
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fit between Chapter 11 and the needs of many businesses. It is generally
agreed that Chapter 11 is too costly and cumbersome for many small en-
terprises. Unfortunately, the other popular reorganization chapter,
Chapter 13, has debt limits5" which are so low that it is not available to
many businesses. Today, there is a substantial support for statutory
changes which would make it easier to deal with the financial problems
of such enterprises. Two types of changes are under consideration: an in-
crease in Chapter 13 debt limits to permit more individual debtors to use
this form of reorganization and the creation of a new type of reorgan-
ization proceeding specially designed to meet the need of small
businesses.
One innovative bankruptcy judge, A. Thomas Small of North Caro-
lina, has already taken concrete action to deal with the delay problem by
establishing a"fast-track" reorganization process for small business deb-
tors. As the bankruptcy petitions are filed, certain small businesses are di-
verted to what Judge Small terms "Chapter 11 (a)". As to these cases,
Judge Small requires expedited filing of the reorganization plan and the
disclosure statement, usually 60 to 90 days after the case is commenced.
As long as the disclosure statement is not defective on its face, it is condi-
tionally approved, and the solicitation of votes is permitted. A final hear-
ing on the adequacy of the disclosure statement is held immediately
before the confirmation hearing.
Judge Small's procedure reduces delay by speeding up plan filings and
by eliminating a step in the confirmation process, the period between the
filing of the plan and the disclosure statement hearing. Conversion of the
case to a liquidation bankruptcy (Chapter 7) or the appointment of an in-
dependent trustee are probable outcomes if the debtor fails to file the ne-
cessary documents by the specified date.Judge Small's innovative court
procedures have attracted many favourable comments but they have not
been widely followed by other judges, possibly because of doubt con-
cerning the statutory authority for fast-track bankruptcies.
729 contains an excellent discussion of the USC §109(e) (1988). Chapter 13 is also
delay problem. available only to individuals. Corporations
50 Unsecured debt of less than $ 100,000 and with any amount of debt are not eligible




There is no legislative support for outright repeal of Chapter 11. How-
ever, it is quite possible that Congress will enact reform legislation in the
near future. A Bill entitled "The Bankruptcy Amendments Act of
1993" 5 has been introduced in the Senate. Similar legislation passed
both Houses of Congress last year, only to fail because final action could
not be taken before adjournment.
The legislation now pending in the Senate deals with some of the mat-
ters which have irritated critics of Chapter 11. One provision,52 for ex-
ample, sets a definite time period for the conclusion of all hearings on a
creditor's motion for relief from stay.
Another provision 53 attempts to deal with the problem of delay in ob-
taining confirmation by controlling excessive extensions of the time
within which the debtor enjoys the exclusive right to propose and obtain
acceptance of a plan. It sets outer limits on extensions of one year (plan
proposal) and 425 days (acceptance) "unless the need for such an in-
crease is attributable to circumstances for which the debtor should not
justly be held accountable." It is not clear that this change in language
will be effective. Bankruptcy judges today have the power to terminate
the exclusive period "for cause" but have generally failed to do so, even
though delay has been seen as a significant problem for a long time.54
More promising are the provisions55 which create a new form of reor-
ganization (Chapter 10) for small business debtors with total liabilities
not exceeding $2,500,000. Time limits for proposing a plan and ob-
taining confirmation are reduced in conjunction with a simplification of
confirmation requirements. The pending legislation also eliminates the
absolute priority rule for debtors filing under Chapter 10. This small
business bankruptcy proposal was inspired byJudge Small's "fast-track
bankruptcy" although it uses other techniques to speed up the reorgan-
ization process.
The Chapter 10 provisions are available only on a limited, experi-
mental basis. Such proceedings are authorised for a period of three years
in only eight judicial districts. Presumably, if this new reorganization
process proves to be a success, it will be reinstated on a nationwide basis.
51 S 540, 103rd Cong, 1st Sess (1993). 54 LoPucki, supra, n 49 at 754.
52 Ibid,§101. 55 S 540 §201.
53 Ibid, §102.
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The limited availability of Chapter 10 will probably result in a constitu-
tional challenge. The United States' Constitution speaks in terms of a
"uniform" bankruptcy law56 and it is arguable that §201 is invalid be-
cause it is not applicable throughout the United States.57
The problem of delay in single asset real estate cases has also received
special attention. Within 90 days after such a case is commenced, the
debtor (i) must have filed a realistic reorganization plan, or (ii) must begin
compensating the secured creditor for the opportunity costs associated
with the stay of its foreclosure action.58 Otherwise, a secured creditor is
entitled to relief from stay.
One possible statutory amendment is notable for its absence. The
pending legislation makes no change in the rule that the pre-bankruptcy
management of the debtor remains in control as a "debtor in posses-
sion". It may be that continuity of business leadership is not as significant
a problem as some critics of Chapter 11 have maintained. It is likely,
however, that the retention of control by pre-bankruptcy management
in prominent bankruptcies will continue to influence public attitudes to-
ward this type of reorganization.
V. Conclusion
Special interest groups have always, to some extent, influenced the con-
tent of bankruptcy legislation in the United States. Lobbying on behalf of
such groups has, however, greatly intensified since 1978. Several provi-
sions in the Bankruptcy Amendments Act are controversial because they
benefit narrowly defined economic interests. It is possible that these fea-
tures of the proposed legislation will create a situation in which enact-
ment of any reforms will prove to be impossible.
56 US Const Art I, §8, cl 4. and Marathon", (1982) 25 Sup Ct Rev
57 Baird, "Bankruptcy Procedure and State - 32-36.
Created Rights: The Lessons of Gibbons 58 S 540 §202(b).
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Even if the pending legislation becomes law in its present form, the at-
tack on Chapter 11 is likely to continue. Nothing in the pending legisla-
tion responds to the harshest criticisms of the American reorganization
process.
